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Abstract 
I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows 
naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast 
to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a 
matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more 
fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. 
He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to 
suppose that at least many animals can be wronged and thus, by 
extension, have rights. The result, I argue, is a perspective on the nature 
of moral rights in general, and the idea of animal rights in particular, that 
constitutes an important and plausible alternative to the more familiar 
views advanced by philosophers in recent decades. 
 
1. Introduction 
Schopenhauer stands as one of the first Western philosophers to accord 
not only moral standing but moral rights to animals.1 On the negative 
side, he denounces the view that they lack such rights as ‘a revolting 
crudity and barbarism of the West’ (BM 238) and, in the case of Spinoza, 
an ‘absurd and abhorrent’ aspect of the latter’s contempt for animals 
(WWR 2:739).2 On the positive side, he notes with approval that ‘in 
                                               
1. The first to do so may have been Rousseau (1755/1992: 14): ‘[S]ince [animals] 
share to some extent in our nature by virtue of the sentient quality with which 
they are endowed, one will judge that they should also participate in natural 
right, and that man is subject to some sort of duties toward them. It seems, in 
effect, that if I am obliged not to do any harm to my fellow man, it is less because 
he is a rational being than because he is a sentient being: a quality that, since it is 
common to both animals and men, should at least give the former the right not to 
be needlessly mistreated by the latter’. 
2. See also FR 98; PP 2:370–71, 376/SW 6:394, 400. I employ the following 
abbreviations in citations of Schopenhauer’s works: BM: ‘On the Basis of 
Morality’, in D. E. Cartwright and E. E. Erdmann (eds.) The Two Fundamental 
Problems of Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, cited by page 
number from SW 4; FR: ‘On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason’, in D. E. Cartwright, E. E. Erdmann, and C. Janaway (eds.) On the 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings, New York: 
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Europe a sense of the rights of animals is gradually awakening in 
proportion to the fading and vanishing of the strange idea that the animal 
world was brought into being merely for humans’ use and amusement, as 
a result of which animals are treated just like things’ (BM 243). Despite the 
popularity of this topic in recent times, however, relatively little attention 
has been paid to the details of Schopenhauer’s account.3 He clearly wants 
to ascribe rights to animals. Yet he does not present a theory of animal 
rights as such. He does offer an analysis of the concept of a right. But he 
never fully connects the dots between this analysis and his belief in animal 
rights. Nor does he fully articulate all the relevant features of that 
analysis. The question therefore arises whether his belief in animal rights 
has a sound basis. 
In what follows, I offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s distinctive 
analysis of the concept of a right, and argue that his ascription of rights to 
animals flows naturally from this analysis. In contrast to those who regard 
rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating 
rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and 
defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account 
of wrongdoing which makes it reasonable to suppose that at least many 
animals can be wronged and thus, by extension, have rights. The result, or 
so I argue, is a perspective on the nature of moral rights in general, and 
the idea of animal rights in particular, that constitutes an important and 
                                                                                                                                
Cambridge University Press, 2012, cited by page number from SW 1; PP: Parerga 
and Paralipomena, E. F. J. Payne (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, cited by 
volume and page number; SW: Sämtliche Werke, A. Hübscher (ed.) Mannheim: F. 
A. Brockhaus, 1988, cited by volume and/or page number; WN: ‘On the Will in 
Nature’, in D. E. Cartwright, E. E. Erdmann, and C. Janaway (eds.) On the 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Other Writings, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, cited by page number from SW 4; WWR 1: The 
World as Will and Representation, J. Norman, A. Welchman, and C. Janaway (eds.) 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, cited by page number from SW 2; 
WWR 2: The World as Will and Presentation, D. Carus and R. E. Aquila (eds.) 
Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, cited by page number from SW 3. Unless 
otherwise noted, I use the cited English translation, though with occasional 
modifications. 
3. For other discussions of Schopenhauer’s animal ethics, which focus mostly on 
other aspects of his view, see Jones 1991, Brosow 2008, Gebert 2008, and Haucke 
2008. 
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plausible alternative to the more familiar views advanced by philosophers 
in recent decades. 
My reconstruction begins with Schopenhauer’s conception of wrong. I 
first characterize the central idea (§2) and then take account of two 
important complications: the significance of motive (§3) and the idea that 
moral beings possess clarity of consciousness in differing degrees (§4). I 
then introduce his conception of rights and argue that he recognizes two 
basic kinds of them: those which express what the right-holder can do 
without wronging others (roughly: liberties) and those which express what 
others cannot do or fail to do without wronging the right-holder (roughly: 
claims) (§5).4 Turning to animals, I next argue that Schopenhauer’s 
understanding of rights, together with the plausible assumption that at 
least many animals have will in the relevant sense, entails that at least 
many animals have rights of the second sort, if not also the first, and that 
some may even have special rights beyond these (§6). Finally, I conclude 
with some reflections on the philosophical significance of this approach, 
particularly in relation to recent work in this area (§7). 
 
2. Wrongdoing: The Basic Idea 
Despite the lexical priority Recht enjoys over Unrecht, Schopenhauer 
maintains that the idea of wrong is genetically prior to that of right. In the 
beginning, the thought goes, people noticed that they were subject to 
being wronged by others, which led to the idea of actions that are right, 
that is, which can be performed without wronging others. The idea of 
right action then eventually led to the idea of a right, something an 
individual A can possess which expresses either what A can do without 
wronging others or what others cannot do or neglect to do without 
wronging A. In order to understand the concept of a right in its proper 
historical sense, then, we must first ask what it means for an action to be 
wrong, or in other words, what it means to wrong someone. 
Schopenhauer sometimes attempts to elucidate the concept of wrong 
by noting that on his view, Unrecht is synonymous with Verletzung or the 
Latin laesio, that is, harm or injury (BM 216–19; PP 2:241/SW 6:257). At 
least for us, however, this observation offers little insight, since the 
concept of injury stands as much in need of elucidation as that of wrong. 
A more helpful line of thought developed by Schopenhauer rests on the 
                                               
4. This distinction was first explicitly drawn, in relation to legal rights, by 
Hohfeld (1919), though what I call ‘liberties’ he refers to as ‘privileges’. For a 
helpful discussion of this terminology, see Jones 1994: 12–22. 
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idea that to wrong someone is fundamentally to encroach on the territory 
of that individual’s will. What this means, expressed less metaphorically, 
is that one individual wrongs another when the former acts in a way that 
prevents the latter’s will from attaining its object. This happens in the first 
instance when an individual thwarts the will of another through some 
kind of violence or coercion. So if A restrains, assaults, or kills B, then A 
interferes with B’s will and thus wrongs B. But it also happens, more 
subtly but no less perniciously, when through cunning or deceit one is 
made to serve another’s will rather than one’s own (WWR 1:398–99). 
Considered in itself, a will’s boundary extends as far as the body in 
which it manifests itself, since for Schopenhauer the body is just an 
objectification of the individual’s will (WWR 1:119–20). Hence, to the 
extent that I manipulate or otherwise do violence to the body of another, I 
wrong that individual. Likewise, the mind itself is an objectification of that 
will. So to manipulate someone’s mind, as in cases of deception, or to 
cause them mental pain or emotional distress, would also be to impede 
their will and thus to wrong them. The will’s scope therefore includes 
both the mind and the body. But it does not stop there. For it also extends 
so far as to encompass any property or possessions that might be acquired 
by the individual. This happens, according to Schopenhauer, through a 
kind of labor-mixing, whereby through its force or work the laborer’s 
body ‘grows together with’ and as it were becomes identified with the 
object (WWR 1:396). Further, he allows that the will’s scope grows so as to 
include any honor acquired by the individual (BM 219; PP 2:241/SW 
6:257). We may therefore say that on his view, A thwarts the will of B, and 
thus wrongs B, not only when A harms or manipulates B’s mind or body, 
but also when A takes or damages B’s property or in some way diminishes 
B’s honor. 
This gives us the basic idea of Schopenhauer’s account of wrong. In 
order to complete the picture, we must now take note of two important 
nuances. The first has to do with motive, the second with differences in 
degree of consciousness.5 
 
3. Motive 
An important objection to the account as I have presented it so far is that it 
is not always wrong to impede the will of another. In the first place, we 
interfere with other wills whenever we act in self-defense. Yet we do not 
                                               
5. For other expositions of Schopenhauer’s account of wrong, see Copleston 1947: 
161–66; Jacquette 2005: 224–28; Jordan 2010: 171–73. 
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thereby wrong the aggressor. Furthermore, we sometimes infringe on the 
territory of another’s will by accident, for example, when we inadvertently 
injure them or damage their property. As long as these acts do not result 
from negligence, they too would seem to involve no wrongdoing. Being 
an infringement therefore appears to be at best only a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition for being a wronging. In order for Schopenhauer’s 
account to be plausible, then, he needs to explain what distinguishes those 
infringements which are wrongings from those which are not. 
One thought Schopenhauer deploys in addressing the case of self-
defense is that, in turning back an aggressor through violence or cunning, 
I am not, properly speaking, encroaching on the territory of another’s will, 
but merely evicting that will, as it were, from my own territory: 
This is because everything that happens on my side falls 
exclusively within the sphere of the affirmation of will that is 
essential to my person as such and is already expressed in it (this 
being the scene of the struggle), and does not encroach into that of 
the other, and is consequently only the negation of the negation, 
which is to say an affirmation that is not itself a negation. Thus 
without doing wrong, I can compel the other will to abstain from its 
negation of my will as this appears in my body, without negating 
any other will that observes a similar limitation. (WWR 1:401) 
From this perspective, the one who defends herself is like a landowner 
who forces a trespasser off her property. By encroaching on the 
landowner’s property, the trespasser in a way negates the former’s will. 
But by negating this negation, by pushing the trespasser back, the 
landowner does not trespass on the other’s property; she simply stops him 
from trespassing on hers. She therefore does no wrong. 
The kind of case Schopenhauer has in mind in this passage is one in 
which an individual defends herself merely by resisting or beating back 
the attack of another, without thereby harming the other’s body, person, 
property, or honor. But while some instances of justifiable self-defense do 
seem to fit this pattern—the case of the landowner who removes the 
trespasser from her property would be one—many do not. In fact, 
Schopenhauer himself admits that legitimate self-defense may even go so 
far as to take the life of one’s attacker (WWR 1:401), and we would be 
hard-pressed to spin this as anything but encroaching on the territory of 
another will. In order to explain why self-defense is not in general wrong, 
then, we need something more. 
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I believe this something more can be found in Schopenhauer’s idea 
that we wrong someone just in case our denial of that individual’s will 
flows from a certain motive. As he explains in his primary discussion of the 
topic, when an individual wards off some attempted wrong through 
violent means, ‘this resistance cannot itself be wrong [...] even if it 
involves an act of violence that would have been wrong on its own, taken 
out of context, and is only justified here by its motive [Motiv], i.e., it becomes 
right’ (WWR 1:400, emphasis mine). In characterizing the violent response 
to an attack as in itself wrong, Schopenhauer appears to acknowledge that 
self-defense often if not always involves infringing on the territory of the 
aggressor’s will. But he clarifies that such an infringement does not 
constitute a wrong, because of the motive behind the response. The 
thought appears to be that in order for an action to be wrong, it must not 
only involve denying the will of another but must also stem from a certain 
motive. This is just what we would expect from someone who holds that 
‘in themselves, all deeds are just empty images that acquire moral 
significance only by virtue of the disposition [Gesinnung] that produces 
them’ (WWR 1:436). 
Schopenhauer casts additional light on his view when he describes the 
act of wronging as the denial of another’s will ‘with the aim of a stronger 
affirmation of one’s own’ (WWR 1:400). Similarly, in his discussion of the 
virtue of righteousness [Gerechtigheit], that is, the disposition not to wrong 
others, he claims that the righteous [gerecht] person will not inflict 
suffering on others ‘in order to enhance his own well-being’ (WWR 1:437) 
and that the essence of righteousness, its innermost being, lies in the 
intention [Vorsatz] ‘not to affirm one’s own will to the point where it 
negates other appearances of the will by forcing them to serve one’s own’ 
(WWR 1:438).6 What Schopenhauer appears to be getting at in these 
remarks is that impeding the will of another wrongs that individual just in 
case it is motivated by something like a desire to elevate one’s own aims 
or interests above those of the other, to affirm one’s own will over that of 
the other. To put the point in slightly different terms, we may say that on 
Schopenhauer’s view, an encroachment constitutes a wrong if (and only 
if) it implies that the encroacher assigns greater importance to her own 
well-being than to that of the one on whose will she encroaches. 
                                               
6. The clause ‘to enhance his own well-being’ was added in the second edition of 
WWR, no doubt to clarify that we wrong others not just when we inflict suffering 
on them, but when we do so from this motive. 
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Such encroachments may take one of two basic forms. Schopenhauer 
gestures toward this when he notes that we feel dissatisfaction with our 
actions not simply because we have acted egoistically, but because ‘we 
have acted too egoistically, with too much regard for our own well-being 
and too little for that of others, or because we have indeed made into our 
ends the woe of another for its own sake without advantage to ourselves’ 
(BM 173–74). Accordingly, a wrongful encroachment may stem from what 
he calls ‘extreme egoism’ [äußerster Egoismus] (BM 200), which involves 
pursuing one’s own ends without proper regard, or even with deliberate 
disregard, for others.7 Even worse, it may be an expression of spite 
[Gehässigkeit], malice [Bosheit], Schadenfreude, or the like, in which the 
mistreatment of another is not the means to one’s end, but the end itself. 
Returning to the case of self-defense, we can now offer a better 
explanation of why, on Schopenhauer’s view, it is not wrong to ward off 
an attack even through violent means. Suppose A attacks B, either through 
violence or cunning, and B defends herself against this attack. If B’s 
response is not out of proportion to the threat, then there is nothing about 
this response that implies that B is attempting to affirm her own will above 
that of A, or in other words, that she intends to elevate her aims above 
those of A. At most it implies only that she regards them as equal. Thus, 
her defensive response would not be wrong, even though she might injure 
A’s body, person, property, or honor. On the other hand, suppose that B’s 
response to A’s attack were out of proportion. For instance, suppose B 
responded to A’s threat to insult her in public by killing A. On 
Schopenhauer’s view, this response would indeed wrong A, even though 
B acted in self-defense. For by ending A’s life in order to protect her 
reputation, or in other words, by causing grievous injury to A in order to 
prevent slight injury to herself, B clearly esteems her own well-being more 
highly than A’s. Similarly, any case of wrongdoing would involve a 
similar kind of elevated sense of self-importance on the part of the one 
doing wrong. 
The motive component of Schopenhauer’s account also allows us to 
see why, on his view, a person who inadvertently thwarts the will of 
                                               
7. Cf. Jacquette 2005: 224: ‘The idea is that an egoistic action that thwarts another 
individual’s pursuit of his or her interests is morally objectionable’. Properly 
speaking, such an encroachment is morally objectionable only if it stems from 
malice or an excessive or exaggerated egoism (cf. Cartwright 1999: 272–73). 
Accordingly, if in the bare pursuit of one’s own self-interest one were to 
inadvertently thwart the will of another, no wrongdoing would occur. 
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another does not thereby wrong that individual. For in such cases there is 
clearly no intention to elevate one’s own aims or interests above those of 
the other. 
 
4. Degrees of Consciousness 
The other nuance in Schopenhauer’s account of wrong stems from his 
belief that conative beings have different degrees of sensibility. Roughly 
put, he holds that a creature’s capacity for suffering correlates with the 
sophistication of its mental life. So, while lower animals such as insects 
would have a relatively limited capacity for suffering, higher animals such 
as dogs, pigs, and whales would have a greater capacity, and humans a 
still greater capacity.8 This difference leads Schopenhauer to conclude that 
even apart from cases of self-defense, a human can sometimes use or take 
the life of an animal without thereby wronging the animal and thus 
without doing wrong. As he explains in a footnote with strong 
consequentialist undertones, 
[B]ecause suffering increases along with the increase in the clarity 
of consciousness, the pain that animals suffer in death or work is 
not as great as that which humans suffer by doing without meat or 
animal power. This is why people can affirm their existence to the 
point of negating the existence of an animal, and the will to live as a 
whole suffers less than if we acted the other way around. This also 
determines the extent to which people can make use of animals 
without doing wrong …. (WWR 1:440n) 
Here Schopenhauer admits that it is not necessarily wrong for humans to 
kill or use animals, even though doing so obviously thwarts the animal’s 
will and even involves intentionally elevating the human’s well-being 
above that of the animal. He offers the rationale that because humans have 
a greater capacity for suffering, their use of animals sometimes leads to 
less suffering overall—less suffering on the part of the will to live on the 
whole, as he puts it—than would otherwise occur. The suggestion 
therefore appears to be that in order for A to wrong B, A must infringe on 
B’s will in a way that does not lead to less overall suffering than would 
have occurred had A not so infringed. From this point of view, if one 
human were to kill and eat another in order to survive, this being the only 
way to avoid starvation, this killing may well be wrong, since it would 
                                               
8. On the diminished capacity for suffering in animals, see WWR 1:365–66; WWR 
2:64–65; WN 76–77; BM 245, 253; PP 1:337n./SW 5:358n. 
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produce no net decline in the suffering of the will to live on the whole. But 
if a human were to kill and eat an animal under analogous circumstances, 
this would not be wrong, because the will to live would suffer more if the 
human were to starve to death than it would if the animal were to be 
killed. Similarly, if horses were used to transport a severely injured 
human to the hospital, the intent being not to harm the horses but to help 
the human, this too would involve no wrong, since the small amount of 
suffering the horses would experience would be more than compensated 
for by the reduction in the amount of suffering experienced by the human. 
Yet Schopenhauer is clear that there are limits to this. For instance, he 
mentions that we often wrong animals when it comes to our treatment of 
‘beasts of burden’ and hunting dogs. He also considers vivisection, 
especially on higher animals, to be wrong (WWR 1:140n; cf. PP 2:373–
77/SW 6:396–401). Similarly, he maintains that when human survival does 
depend on killing animals for food, we should at least make their death as 
painless as possible, for instance, by using chloroform (BM 245; PP 2:375–
76/SW 6:399).9 The thought appears to be that in all such cases, our 
infringements result in more, not less, overall suffering, and consequently 
we wrong the animals. 
In tying the wrongness of an action to its effect on the overall amount 
of suffering in the world, Schopenhauer may appear to be espousing a 
kind of consequentialism. But this is almost surely not his intent, since he 
maintains that the moral worth of an action stems from the motive 
[Motiv], or more accurately, the incentive [Triebfeder] from which it 
springs, not from the consequences it produces: from its cause, not its 
                                               
9. Schopenhauer remarks that ‘by abstaining from animals as food, humans, 
especially in the north, would suffer more than would the animal through a 
quick and even unforeseen death, which perhaps should be alleviated even more 
by means of chloroform’ (BM 245). Of course, this by no means constitutes an 
endorsement of the modern practices of intensive animal farming, which he 
doubtless would have viewed with disdain, much as he viewed vivisection. In 
fact, given the remarkable developments of the last 150 years in plant agriculture, 
food production, transportation, and other such areas, a much greater proportion 
of the human population can now survive and even thrive without relying on 
animal products and by-products, even in places like Germany. Thus, one 
imagines that if Schopenhauer were alive today, he might well advocate the 
widespread adoption of a vegetarian or perhaps even a vegan diet. Cf. PP 2:375–
76/SW 6:399. On Schopenhauer’s advocacy on behalf of animals, see Libell 1998. 
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effect.10 It would therefore be rather out of character for him to suggest 
that the moral wrongness of an action derives from its failure to minimize 
aggregate suffering. A more likely hypothesis is that Schopenhauer wants 
to link the motive of a wrong action in some way with the degree to which 
the will to live suffers on the whole. We have so far said that on his view, 
A wrongs B when A affirms her will so far as to deny the will of B, or more 
precisely, when A infringes on the will of B with the intent of elevating her 
own aims above those of B. But given the moral significance he assigns to 
differences in capacity for suffering, this cannot be quite right. For if A has 
a greater degree of sensibility than B, then it is not necessarily wrong for A 
to deny the will of B. A’s denial only becomes wrong when it goes too far, 
that is, when A affirms her will at the expense of B’s in a way that is out of 
proportion with the difference between A’s degree of consciousness and 
that of B. So a more accurate statement of Schopenhauer’s account would 
be that A wrongs B just in case A denies the will of B with the intent of 
affirming her own will to a degree that is out of proportion with the 
degree to which A’s capacity for suffering outstrips B’s. 
A brief consideration of a few examples will confirm that this account 
accords nicely with Schopenhauer’s claims about wrong action. In the first 
place, in all the cases where one human injures another through assault, 
insult, or theft, though not in self-defense, it will follow that the first does 
wrong the second, because the one acts with the intention of elevating her 
aims above those of the other, even though the two have a (roughly) equal 
capacity for suffering.11 But for the reasons already noted, if a human who 
                                               
10. In Schopenhauer’s terminology, motive (Motiv) is a cognized end that calls 
forth an action by stimulating an incentive or driving force (Triebfeder) (cf. BM 210), 
the latter being something like an aspect or disposition of the agent’s character or 
will. The four basic motives or ends of action are (1) one’s own well-being, (2) 
another’s well-being, (3) another’s woe, and (4) one’s own woe (BM 227; cf. 
WWR 2:695n). Corresponding to the first three motives are the three 
fundamental incentives relevant to morality: egoism, compassion (Mitleid), and 
malice (BM 210). Though Schopenhauer does sometimes appear to suggest that 
the moral worth of a praiseworthy action derives from the motive (cf. BM 134, 
204, 207–8), I agree with an anonymous referee that, on Schopenhauer’s 
considered view, moral worth derives from the agent’s character, specifically, the 
incentive of compassion. 
11. Schopenhauer acknowledges that even among humans ‘clarity of 
consciousness has innumerable degrees, namely from the dullest, empty mind to 
the genius’ (WN 76–77). Given what he says elsewhere, this appears to commit 
him to the view that not all humans are morally equal and that under some 
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is under attack from another human defends herself with an appropriate 
degree of force, this would not be a case of wronging, since in defending 
herself she does not intend to elevate her aims above the other’s. Next, in 
the case of humans using animals for food or labor, this would be justified 
under limited circumstances. If a human has no alternative source of 
nourishment, and kills an animal in order to survive, this would not be 
wrong, since the human would not be esteeming her own well-being to an 
exaggerated degree. However, if a human were to, say, subject an animal 
to cruelty in order to derive a small degree of amusement, this would 
indeed be wrong by the standard of this account, because in valuing a 
small degree of amusement more highly than the intense suffering of an 
admittedly lesser animal, the human would be exaggerating the 
significance of her own aims relative to those of the animal. The same 
would be true, at least by Schopenhauer’s lights, in cases of vivisection 
and the excessive exploitation of the labor of animals. 
 
5. Rights 
Having now arrived at what I take to be Schopenhauer’s fully nuanced 
account of wrongdoing, we can turn to the issue of rights. I have said that 
on his view, the idea of a right, as something which can be possessed, 
grows out of the notion of wronging. It does so in something like the 
following way. The idea that we sometimes wrong one another, and thus 
that our actions are sometimes wrong, leads to the idea of a right action as 
any action that does not wrong another. This in turn leads to the idea of a 
right as the ability to do something, or to take or use something, without 
wronging anyone. Thus, a person can be said to have a right to breathe air, 
to be on public lands, to admire the starlit sky, and so forth, because none 
of these actions would wrong anyone. Similarly, I have a right to defend 
myself against some act of violence or cunning because, in accordance 
with what has already been said, such a response would not wrong my 
attacker (or anyone else). But I do not have a right to do anything that 
would wrong another. So I do not have a right to assault, steal, trespass, or 
insult, though in the case of animals, Schopenhauer thinks, we humans do 
                                                                                                                                
circumstances, a person can elevate her aims above another’s, denying the will of 
the other in the process, without thereby wronging that individual. However, it 
may be that the differences in degree of consciousness among humans are 
relatively small compared to those between humans and animals, and that for 
nearly all practical purposes, humans can be regarded as equal with respect to 
their capacity for suffering. 
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have a right to kill and use them up to a point. This basic sense of a right 
corresponds to what Hohfeld (1919) calls a privilege and others more 
appropriately call a liberty. 
Schopenhauer sometimes gives the impression that on his view, all 
rights are liberties in this sense. For example, he remarks that ‘human 
rights [Menschenrechte] are easy to determine; everyone has the right to do 
that which injures no one’ (PP 2:241/SW 6:257). But clearly there are more 
rights on his view than just liberties. For when he chides other 
philosophers for denying that animals have rights, his point cannot be 
merely the trivial thought that animals can do many things without 
wronging others. His point is rather that animals can be wronged, that our 
conduct toward them has moral significance, even apart from its bearing 
on ourselves and other humans. He contrasts the view that animals have 
rights with the belief that animals are mere things with which we can do 
as we please. Likewise, he equates the view that they lack rights with ‘the 
delusion that our actions toward them are without moral significance’ 
(BM 238). Obviously the rights he has in mind in these contexts concern 
not what can be done without wronging another, but what cannot be done 
by others without wronging the right-holder. To have a right in this sense 
is just to be capable of being wronged, as when we say, for instance, that a 
person has a right to humane treatment, because to treat her otherwise 
would be to wrong her. These rights correspond roughly to what, 
following Hohfeld, we now call claims. More precisely, they are negative 
claims, since they concern not the provision but the withholding of 
something, namely, the interference of another. 
In addition to liberty-rights and negative claim-rights, Schopenhauer 
also recognizes the existence of positive claim-rights. Unlike negative 
claims, which are general in the sense that they express facts about the 
right-holder’s relationship to all moral beings or at least all moral agents, 
positive claims are those which arise because one or more moral agents 
enter into an agreement with the right-holder. Thus, if A enters into an 
agreement with B to provide the latter with some good or service, but then 
reneges on the agreement, A wrongs B. So in accordance with the idea of a 
right as the negation of a wrong, Schopenhauer recognizes that the 
agreement between A and B endows B with a right to the promised good 
or service from A. This right is a claim because it expresses what A cannot 
do, or rather cannot fail to do, without wronging B. But since it is a right 
to the provision of something positive (i.e., the good or service) rather 
than to the absence of something positive (i.e., interference), the right is 
positive. B’s right is therefore a positive claim. 
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Rights are often said to correlate with duties. For Schopenhauer, 
matters are not so simple. As he sees it, philosophers such as Kant have 
enlarged the concept of duty well beyond its proper sphere, with the 
result being that we are said to have many duties, such as a duty to help 
others, which we could often fail to perform without actually wronging 
anyone. In contrast, Schopenhauer maintains that a duty, properly 
speaking, is simply any action which one cannot decline to perform 
without wronging another (BM 220–22). So, for instance, in our previous 
example, A does have a duty to provide B with the promised good or 
service, because if A were to fail to provide that service, then A would be 
wronging B. But A does not have any duty to help others in general, since 
to withhold help from them would not be to wrong them, even if it might 
be cruel and repugnant (WWR 1:400).12 From this point of view, the only 
duties or obligations one has are those which arise from agreements. 
When A enters into the agreement with B, A assumes a duty and B 
acquires a right. Furthermore, since such agreements always involve a 
mutual exchange of goods or services—A agrees to provide B with the 
good or service only because B agrees to provide something in return—B 
also assumes a duty and A also acquires a right. Thus, if I were to contract 
with Fred to mow my lawn for the tidy sum of twenty dollars, then I 
would thereby acquire a right to Fred’s service, while he would undertake 
a duty to provide that service. At the same time, he would acquire a right 
to be paid twenty dollars upon mowing my lawn, while I would 
undertake a duty to pay him. We may therefore say that on 
Schopenhauer’s view, even though rights do not in general correlate with 
duties, positive claims do correlate with duties. 
Schopenhauer maintains that an individual’s specific rights typically 
arise from an explicit, mutual agreement. He does, however, recognize 
one important exception to this general rule. The problem with taking the 
rule to be exceptionless is that if it were, parents would have no duty or 
                                               
12. Some critics have suggested that if animals had rights, we would have an 
obligation to prevent natural predation (Ritchie 1895: 109–10; Warren 1997: 111–
14; cf. McCloskey 1965: 123). On Schopenhauer’s view, however, this does not 
follow. Though intervening to prevent one animal from killing another might, 
under some circumstances, be compassionate and thus morally good, not doing 
so would not thwart anyone’s will, thus would not wrong anyone. Since we have 
a duty or obligation to perform only those actions the omission of which would 
wrong someone, it follows that we have no duty to prevent or discourage natural 
predation. 
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obligation to provide for their young children, who are incapable of 
entering into agreements. Now many versions of contractarianism may 
indeed have this consequence.13 But Schopenhauer is not willing to go so 
far. He recognizes that if his view is to be plausible, he must make room 
for the possibility of a person undertaking a duty even apart from a 
mutual agreement. He therefore allows that in the case of a parent’s duty 
to care for her child, that duty ‘is not taken on by means of an agreement, 
but immediately through mere action, because those to whom one has this 
obligation were not present when it was undertaken’ (BM 221). What 
Schopenhauer appears to be suggesting is that, even though in the typical 
case one assumes a duty through an explicit, mutual agreement, all that is 
really needed to generate this sort of duty is that one make a commitment 
to another individual to provide them something. In the case of the 
parent, this commitment is not typically an explicit one but is made 
implicitly by the mere fact of voluntarily bringing the child into existence, 
giving birth to it, or the like.14 
To summarize: Schopenhauer understands rights as in one way or 
another negations of wrong. Some rights express those actions that we can 
do without wronging anyone, while others express those actions that 
others cannot do, or fail to do, without wronging the right-holder. Among 
the latter, only those which concern what others cannot fail to do without 
wronging correlate with duties, in the proper sense of the term. So any 
being that is capable of acting without wronging others has rights in the 
first sense, and any being that is capable of being wronged has rights in 
the second. Finally, anyone to whom something has been promised has a 
right to that thing, while the promiser has a duty to provide it. 
 
6. Animal Rights 
It should now be a fairly straightforward matter to see why Schopenhauer 
accords rights—specifically, claims—to animals. We have seen that on his 
analysis, to have a right in this sense is just to be capable of being 
wronged. The question, then, is whether animals can be wronged; and on 
his analysis, it seems clear that they can. For in order to be capable of 
                                               
13. On the difficulty of grounding parental obligations within a contractarian 
framework, see Eekelaar 1991. 
14. Here I take Schopenhauer to be endorsing a voluntarist account of parental 
obligation akin to the one defended recently by Brake (2010), rather than a 
merely causal account such as those of Archard (2010), Prusak (2013), and Porter 
(2014). 
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being wronged, it suffices that one have a will that can be thwarted, where 
by ‘will’ Schopenhauer does not mean anything particularly advanced. He 
certainly does not have in mind the Scholastic conception of will as a 
rational appetite. Nor does he have in mind something which requires 
beliefs, knowledge of a language, or a concept of self. Rather, for him, will 
(in this sense) refers simply to a conscious appetite or desire, something 
which at least many animals, including most vertebrates and even some 
invertebrates, can plausibly be supposed to possess.15 Hence, it follows 
that many animals have rights in this sense.16 For instance, they have 
rights not to be treated cruelly, not to be exploited for our amusement, not 
to be killed or caused to suffer unnecessarily, and so forth.17 In all such 
cases, we wrong them by affirming our own wills so far as to deny theirs 
in a way that outstrips the degree to which our capacity for suffering 
exceeds theirs. 
The conclusion that animals have rights in this sense is significant 
because it means that, contra Kant and most of the Western philosophical 
tradition, our conduct towards them does have moral significance, even 
apart from its bearing on ourselves.18 It means, for example, that it is 
wrong, and thus immoral, for us to cause them great harm for the sake of 
amusement or convenience; and this not because of what it does to us, but 
because of what it does to them. To affirm this much, however, is not to 
suggest that it is always wrong for us to use or kill animals. For the same 
analysis of moral rights which justifies ascribing them to many animals 
(and most humans), also reveals that those rights do not have the 
                                               
15. For substantiation of this claim, see DeGrazia 1996: 129–43; Varner 2002: 26–
54; Carruthers 2011: 378–82. According to Carruthers, empirical evidence 
warrants the conclusion that mammals, birds, and navigating invertebrates 
(including bees, wasps, and spiders) all have desires or goals that are capable of 
being frustrated. 
16. Carl Cohen (1997: 95; Cohen and Regan 2001: 30–31) maintains that in order 
to possess rights, one must be capable of doing wrong; and on this basis he 
denies that animals can have rights. From Schopenhauer’s perspective, however, 
Cohen’s reasoning is confused. The question is not whether animals can wrong, 
but whether they can be wronged. 
17. In addition to vivisection, Schopenhauer mentions coursing, bullfighting, 
horse-racing, and whipping draft animals to death (BM 162), as well as chaining 
up dogs and caging birds (PP 2:376–77n/SW 6:398n), as examples of shameful 
practices. 
18. On Kant’s view of animals, see Korsgaard 2011, especially §5. 
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abolitionist implications they have often been thought to have.19 From the 
perspective of this analysis, many animals have various rights. But they 
do not have a right to life or to non-interference that makes it always 
wrong to kill or use them. As we have seen, there can be circumstances 
under which humans can kill or use animals without wronging them, and 
thus without violating any rights. The possession of rights by animals 
does not, therefore, entail that we cannot rightly kill them for food, 
experiment on them, and so forth. Rather, it entails only that there are 
limits to the circumstances under which, and reasons for which, we can 
treat animals in such ways without being immoral. 
When Schopenhauer speaks of animals having rights, he no doubt has 
in mind the kind of negative claims just mentioned. But I would like to 
call attention to three other kinds of rights which he does not ascribe to 
animals, but which he appears to commit himself to ascribing to them. The 
first is liberties. On Schopenhauer’s account, one has a right in this sense, 
that is, a right to φ, just in case one can φ without wronging another (see 
§5). But it would appear that animals can do many things without 
wronging others. In fact, though Schopenhauer does not say this, it is 
tempting to think that animals are entirely incapable of wronging others. 
To be sure, they do affirm their own wills, and in the process they 
sometimes deny the will of another. But the animal’s denial of another’s 
will is always incidental.  If one animal kills another, or even a human, the 
impetus is always some basic appetite such as hunger, an emotion such as 
fear, or perhaps playfulness or curiosity, but in any case not a malicious or 
excessively egoistic desire to elevate one’s own aims above those of 
another. Indeed, Schopenhauer explicitly denies that animals have 
intention (Vorsatz), which on his account is necessary for wrongdoing 
(WWR 2:65). It would therefore seem that on his view, animals can do no 
wrong, and thus have a right, in this sense, to do anything they are 
capable of doing. This also explains why it makes no sense to speak of 
animals violating the rights of other. Even if they act in ways that impede 
the will of another, they lack the kind of complex, self-exalting intention 
required for wrongdoing. 
Second, Schopenhauer’s view appears to imply that animals can have 
property rights. As I noted in §2, he endorses a labor-mixing theory 
according to which any natural resource that is not already owned 
                                               
19. The assumption that rights must have abolitionist implications has led at least 
one scholar (Jones 1991: 131) to conclude—mistakenly, and despite clear 
evidence to the contrary—that Schopenhauer denies rights to animals. 
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becomes the property of the one who labors on it in the form of either 
improving it or protecting it from harm. But this seems to be exactly what 
happens, for instance, when beavers build a dam or a bird builds a nest. In 
contrast with Locke (1689: §§25–26), who appears to limit the class of those 
who can acquire property to those to whom God has given all things in 
common, that is, humans, Schopenhauer’s account of property includes 
no such qualification. Animals certainly seem capable of mixing their 
labor with natural resources, and in doing so, they often ‘improve’ them, 
for example, by taking scattered sticks and forming them into a nest. In 
some cases they even protect their nests and the other fruits of their labor 
from harm. Hence, it seems to follow on Schopenhauer’s account that 
animals can acquire property and thus can have property rights.20 In 
particular, they would have a right not to have their property damaged or 
taken by humans in a way that would wrong them. Thus, although 
disturbing the property of an animal would not be inherently wrong, it 
would be wrong, thus would violate the animal’s right, under many 
circumstances, as for example if we were to destroy a beaver dam for the 
sake of amusement or a small degree of convenience. 
The third type of animal right to which Schopenhauer appears to have 
committed himself is positive claims resulting from commitments that 
particular humans make to care for certain animals. We have seen that on 
his view, parents assume a duty to care for their child by the mere act of 
bringing that child into existence, while the child acquires a correlative 
right to that care. But if this be admitted, then it becomes difficult to see 
how Schopenhauer can avoid applying this sort of reasoning more 
broadly. In the first place, it seems not to matter whether the child is one’s 
biological offspring or adopted. In the former case, the parents assume the 
duty ‘immediately through a mere action’ (BM 221), presumably the act of 
conceiving, the decision to carry the pregnancy to term, the act of giving 
birth, or something along those lines. But the act of agreeing to adopt a 
child would seem to be just as efficacious in generating a duty. If the act of 
conceiving generates a duty to care for the resulting child, why would the 
act of agreeing to adopt a child not likewise generate such a duty? In the 
second place, it now seems as if consistency requires Schopenhauer to 
admit that any act through which one knowingly brings another into 
being or even takes another under one’s wing, as it were, suffices to 
generate an obligation, that is, a duty, to care for the other so long as that 
                                               
20. For a similar point, though made in connection with Locke’s account of 
property, see Rachels 1989: 124–25. 
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care is needed. But this has far-reaching implications, particularly for 
animals. For it implies that if a human adopts a companion animal such as 
a cat or dog, she thereby assumes a duty to care for that animal as long as 
the care is needed.21 Similarly, it implies that anyone who participates in 
animal husbandry, or who otherwise breeds and raises animals for some 
purpose, would likewise have a duty to care for those animals. So, for 
example, the dairy farmer would have a duty to care for the cows she 
raises for milk production, as well as the offspring who are generated as a 
by-product of that process. Hence, Schopenhauer’s position on duties 
seems to commit him to the view that many humans have duties to care 
for particular animals, and thus that many animals have the correlative 
rights to that care from those humans. 
 
7. Philosophical Significance 
Having now completed my reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s case for 
animal rights, I want to conclude by calling attention to three respects in 
which his account compares favorably with views that have been 
advanced by rights-theorists in recent decades. 
The first concerns Schopenhauer’s distinctive conception of moral or 
‘pure ethical’ rights, as he calls them (BM 218). Rights of this sort are 
commonly supposed to have a special normative force by which they 
impose absolute or at least very strong constraints on our conduct.22 But 
for this very reason they have also raised suspicion among many 
philosophers, especially those of a utilitarian cast of mind.23 The worries 
here have varied, but Frey (1980: 8–17) captures one central concern nicely 
when he argues that these rights are either doubtful or superfluous—
doubtful if the constraints they allegedly generate cannot be derived from 
our considered moral principles, and superfluous if they can. In contrast, 
Schopenhauer articulates a conception of moral rights that renders the 
existence of such rights relatively uncontroversial. On his analysis, rights 
are simply expressions of that which is, in one way or another, not wrong. 
                                               
21. For a recent development of this theme, see Burgess-Jackson 1998. 
22. See, e.g., the characterizations of rights as trumps over the interests of the 
many (Dworkin 1977: 364–68; Dworkin 1984; Cohen and Regan 2001) or as 
inviolable constraints on our actions (Nozick 1974: 29–33). 
23. Early critics of moral or natural rights include Burke (1790), Bentham (1843), 
and Ritchie (1895). The many recent examples include Nelson (1976), Young 
(1978), Frey (1980; 1983), Singer (1987), and Foreman (2015). 
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In the most important case, that of claims, a right expresses what cannot 
be done to the right-holder without wronging that individual. Hence, to 
affirm rights in this sense is simply to endorse the thought that some 
individuals, human or otherwise, can be wronged, and indeed, can be 
wronged independent of any positive law (BM 218). To be sure, this 
thought is not entirely above reproach. For instance, some moral skeptics 
may well deny that there is any such thing as wrongdoing. Others may 
allow that people can be wronged, though not apart from positive law. On 
the whole, however, the claim that at least some individuals can be 
wronged, even apart from positive law, would seem to be relatively 
uncontroversial, even among philosophers. Moral rights in 
Schopenhauer’s sense should therefore raise few objections. 
To the extent that this is an advantage of Schopenhauer’s account, it is 
one he purchases at what some may consider an unacceptable expense, 
namely, the loss of the special normative force that lies at the heart of the 
usual conception of rights. On his view, rights do not impose any 
additional constraints on our actions, that is, in addition to those imposed 
by the principle that it is immoral to wrong someone. So the first horn of 
Frey’s dilemma does not apply. What about the second? For 
Schopenhauer, rights-talk is simply a convenient way of talking about 
ways of not wronging. The concept of wrong does all the heavy lifting. In 
fact, all use of ‘right’ and its cognates could be eliminated from his moral 
theory and that theory would still be complete. Whatever one might have 
been tempted to express in terms of rights could simply be put in terms of 
not-wronging. In this sense there is a grain of truth in the charge of 
superfluity. Yet whatever we might say about the language of rights, it is 
important to see that the concept of rights plays a critical role in 
Schopenhauer’s thought. For without it we would lose the morally 
important category of actions that can or cannot be done without 
wronging others. 
One thought which may have occurred to the reader by now is that 
Schopenhauer’s approach, though couched in the language of rights, is 
actually closer in spirit to consequentialism than to what we have come to 
think of as rights-based approaches. After all, one who possesses rights in 
his sense can still be rightfully killed, restrained, used, and so forth, as 
long as the incentive for so doing is concern or love for others and not 
excessive egoism or malice toward the right-holder, just as on a 
consequentialist approach, it is not wrong to treat others in such ways if 
doing so produces the best consequences. In response, I concede that the 
thought is true, at least in one important respect: both Schopenhauer and 
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the consequentialist deny that actions have any moral worth in 
themselves. It should be noted, however, that Schopenhauer’s view is 
actually even closer to a virtue-theoretic approach. Indeed, it is a virtue-
theoretic approach, insofar as it locates the moral worth of an action not in 
the action itself or its effects, but in its cause, namely, the motive or 
incentive from which it flows.24 His theory can accordingly be viewed as 
an account of how to think about rights within a broadly virtue-ethical 
framework.25 
Moving on, the second significant feature of Schopenhauer’s account is 
that it establishes a clear and intelligible connection between the concept 
of a right and a criterion for the possession of rights. This is significant 
because other rights-theorists have struggled to do this. Typically they 
have left the connection at an intuitive level, with the result being that 
even those who share the same basic understanding of the nature of rights 
have arrived at different criteria for their possession. For instance, among 
those who define rights as valid claims, various extensionally divergent 
criteria have been proposed: being human (Cohen 1997; Cohen and Regan 
2001: 30–38), having interests (Feinberg 1974), having inherent value 
(Regan 2004), and so forth. Yet the authors of these proposals have cast 
little light on the connection between the idea of a valid claim and their 
preferred criterion. The point can be illustrated in another way by 
considering the views of H. J. McCloskey. In his earlier treatment of the 
subject, he maintains that rights, as ‘entitlements to do, have, enjoy or 
have done’ (1965: 118), can be possessed only by those who have interests, 
which he denies to animals (ibid.: 126). On this basis, he concludes that 
animals cannot have rights. However, he admits that the concept of 
interest is ‘an obscure and elusive one’ (ibid.), and he offers no clear 
explanation of the connection between a right, so conceived, and the 
possession of interests. Now fast-forward fourteen years. In some fuller 
and more mature reflections on the topic of animal rights, McCloskey 
admits that his earlier arguments were ‘mistaken, misconceived, and 
misdirected in quite a number of ways’ (1979: 36). One of these mistakes 
was ‘linking interests and the having of interests, with the having of the 
                                               
24. Cf. n. 10. On Schopenhauer’s view as a kind of virtue ethics, see Atwell 1990: 
67–142, and Cartwright 1999. For a recent defense of a motive-centered approach 
to ethics, see Slote 2001. 
25. Virtue ethicists have tended to eschew the concept of rights. See, for instance, 
Hursthouse 2006 and Hursthouse 2011. 
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capacity to be a bearer of rights’ (ibid.: 37). He now admits that he sees no 
convincing argument to this effect, and he dismisses the arguments of 
Leonard Nelson (1956), a pioneer of this view, as ‘only the flimsiest of 
arguments, definitional fiats rather than genuine arguments’ (ibid.: 37–38). 
Instead, he now proposes that rights belong to just those beings who 
exercise ‘moral autonomy’, that is, ‘a capacity to act and to decide to act on 
the basis of a moral evaluation of the alternative possible actions’ (ibid.: 
31, 41). (Not coincidentally, McCloskey also reverses course on the issue 
whether animals have interests. He now admits that they do, though he 
still denies them rights, since they fail to satisfy the newer, stronger 
criterion.) But what is the connection between rights, still understood as 
entitlements to do or have, or to not have done or taken, and this sort of 
moral autonomy? In essence, McCloskey’s thought is that such 
entitlements can properly be ascribed only to those who are themselves 
capable of demanding or waiving that to which they are entitled, or who 
would so act if they did possess such capacities (ibid.: 29–30). But what is 
the connection between rights, so conceived, and this sort of capacity? 
Unfortunately, McCloskey leaves this at an intuitive level. In the end, his 
case for this new criterion is just as much a matter of definitional fiat as 
Nelson’s. 
The point I want to make about Schopenhauer’s account is that, by 
offering a deeper analysis of the concept of a right (that is, deeper than the 
bare idea of an entitlement or valid claim), he succeeds in establishing an 
intelligible connection between that concept and a criterion for the 
possession of rights. As we have seen, he analyzes rights in terms of 
wrong, and the latter in terms of a kind of thwarting of the will of another. 
Thus, it follows that rights, at least in the sense of claims, belong to just 
those beings who have a will that is capable of being thwarted, that is, 
who have a will. From this point of view, the correct criterion for the 
possession of rights is not humanity, rationality, inherent value, the 
possession of interests, or what have you; rather, it is simply that of 
having wishes, desires, appetites, or any of those conscious, conative 
states that can be grouped under the general term will.26 
                                               
26. Feinberg (1974: 52; cf. 49–50) maintains that interests ‘are compounded out of 
desires and aims’. This might appear to bring his interest criterion into line with 
Schopenhauer’s volitional criterion. However, Feinberg also claims that desires 
and aims ‘presuppose something like belief, or cognitive awareness’ (ibid.: 52), 
and even though he notes that many higher animals seem to be among the kinds 
of beings who can have rights (ibid.: 50), one might well doubt whether they 
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As before, I do not mean to suggest that Schopenhauer’s criterion is 
above reproach. One might well question his analysis of wrong, and in the 
process call that criterion into doubt. For instance, one might hold that 
wronging is always the violation of a mutual agreement, thus restricting 
rights to those who have entered into, and hence are capable of entering 
into, such agreements. It is not my intent here to argue that 
Schopenhauer’s analysis of wrong is the correct one, though I do consider 
it plausible. The more modest point I am making is just that by analyzing 
right and wrong as he does, Schopenhauer accomplishes what many other 
rights-theorists have failed to do: namely, establish an intelligible 
connection between the concept of a right and a particular criterion for the 
possession of rights. 
The third significant feature of Schopenhauer’s account is that the 
criterion for rights-possession it generates has a fairly straightforward 
application to the case of animals. This advantage cannot be claimed by all 
such criteria. For instance, the suggestion that rights belong to all and only 
those with interests has spawned a vigorous debate about whether 
animals possess interests in the requisite sense (McCloskey 1965; Feinberg 
1974; Frey 1980). Likewise, Regan’s idea that at least many animals have 
inherent value, and thus have rights, has raised serious doubts (Cohen 
1997: 100–1; Cohen and Regan 2001: 52–55, 246–54; Rowlands 2009: 86–97). 
But whatever doubts we might have about whether animals possess 
interests or inherent value, it seems clear that at least many animals, 
including nearly all well-formed, adult vertebrates, have a will in the basic 
sense Schopenhauer requires for being capable of being wronged. Indeed, 
as I noted above (n. 15), Carruthers (2011: 378–82) has argued on the basis 
of empirical evidence that not only mammals and birds, but even 
navigating invertebrates such as bees, wasps, and spiders, all have desires 
or goals that are capable of being frustrated.27 
                                                                                                                                
have beliefs in the requisite sense (cf. Frey 1980: 55–59, 111–18). On 
Schopenhauer’s view, in contrast, an animal need not be supposed to have 
beliefs in order to be said to have a will and thus rights. 
27. See also DeGrazia 1996: 129–43; Varner 2002: 26–54. Carruthers (2005: 177–94; 
2011: 375–77) also argues that this sort of desire frustration constitutes 
psychological harm and, as such, is the proper object of our sympathy. In this 
respect, his view bears a striking resemblance to Schopenhauer’s, though his 
contractarian moral theory leads him to rather different conclusions about the 
rights and more generally the moral status of animals (cf. Carruthers 1992; 2011: 
385–401). 
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In view of these points, I conclude that there is much of value in 
Schopenhauer’s distinctive approach to rights. He articulates a notion of 
moral right that should be acceptable to most philosophers, even many of 
those who object to moral rights as they are usually understood. His 
analysis also establishes a clear and intelligible connection between the 
concept of a right and a criterion for the possession of rights, namely, that 
of possessing a will. Finally, this criterion allows us to say with some 
confidence that at least many animals do have rights in this sense. In sum, 
he offers a way of thinking about moral rights that makes it plausible to 
believe that there are such rights, that at least many animals possess them, 
and consequently that, given our motives, many of the ways we treat 
them violate these rights and thus are immoral. In many ways, this 
account represents a promising alternative to the more familiar animal 
rights positions advanced in recent years. 
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